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On 14 January 2015 – exactly one year after the German Constitutional Court (GCC) had referred for the first
time in its history preliminary questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – Advocate General (AG) Cruz
Villalón presented his opinion in the OMT case (Case C-62/14). The case is, in essence, about the legality of the
‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ programme of the ECB (OMT)  under EU law. This concerns first of all the
question, whether the OMT is covered by the ECB’s monetary policy mandate (Article 127(1) TFEU) or rather
amounts to the conduct of economic policy, for which the Union only has a coordinating competence (Article 5(1)
TFEU). Moreover, the question has been raised whether the OMT violates the prohibition of monetary financing
(Article 123(1) TFEU). In its order for reference the GCC had stated in a rather unusually clear language that the
OMT violates the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) if it was considered in its entirety to be in conformity with EU
law. The finding of the unconstitutionality of the OMT would mean that the German central bank (Deutsche
Bundesbank) would be prohibited from taking part in a possible future implementation of the OMT. The legal
validity of these arguments has been discussed rather controversially (see e.g. the special issue on this topic of
the German Law Review).
In its preliminary ruling in due course the ECJ will have to find the ‘golden mean’. On the one hand, it is
improbable that the European judges will risk a constitutional conflict with the highest German court by given
their unqualified approval of the OMT. On the other hand, not only the unlikely rejection of the OMT in its entirety,
but also the imposition of limits on the overall amount of purchases of government bonds could compromise the
success of the mere announcement of the OMT in calming the markets and, moreover, provoke a resurgence of
the Euro area financial and debt crisis. Arguably the dilemmas this involves are reflected in the opinion on this
case by Advocate General Cruz Villalón.
AG considers OMT to be a monetary policy measure
The AG considers the OMT to be an ‘unconventional monetary policy measure’ covered by the ECB’s mandate.
For the purpose of framing and implementing the Union’s monetary policy the ECB enjoys a broad discretion
because of its technical expertise and reputation. According to this view even a measure such as the OMT that
is not producing immediate effects on price stability but aimed at sending out signals to the real economy is still
covered by the mandate of the ECB.
Should the ECJ follow the AG’s reasoning, a constitutional standoff between the Karlsruhe and Luxemburg court
becomes a realistic scenario in case the GCC sticks to its original position. Indeed, in its order for reference the
GCC clearly stated that it does not consider the correction of a disruption to the monetary policy transmission
mechanism to be a monetary policy measure, thereby favouring a narrower interpretation of the scope of
discretion of the ECB in conducting monetary policy than what can be found in the opinion of the AG. Contrary to
what the AG argues, the purchase of government bonds under the OMT may, in the eyes of the German Court,
support monetary policy, but is nevertheless to be classified as an economic policy measure.
Arguably the position of the AG is more convincing. In fact, the inclusion of measures that may have economic
policy effects in the category of monetary policy measures is a consequence of the broad discretion of the ECB
in the conduct of monetary policy. This view is not only backed by the wording of Article 127(1) TFEU, which
includes the support of the general economic policies as a secondary, albeit subordinated, objective of the ECB,
but also by the scope and limits of judicial review of central bank decisions. Judicial interpretation cannot
substitute a central bank’s understanding of complex economic situations. It would, moreover, open the door for
judge’s personal views on matters of public policy entering the decision-making process. Courts have to control
the limits of discretion which are set by the EU principle of proportionality that applies to all measures taken by
EU institutions.
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The AG dedicates around forty paragraphs to the proportionality test of a possible implementation of the OMT. It
would exceed the limits of this blogpost to go into the details of the suggested proportionality test. The test
requires, in brief, a written justification for the concrete measure which must be exceptional and restricted to
specific cases. The boundaries of proportionality are crossed only where purchases would inevitably lead the
ECB to a situation in which it is facing insolvency (para 195).
ECB’s action within ‘troika’ is an economic policy measure
Special attention should be given to the argument that the ECB’s role in the financial assistance programmes
amounts to an economic policy measure which surpasses the mandate of the ECB. Since the implementation of
the OMT is linked to the compliance with certain policy goals under financial assistance programmes of the
EFSF/ESM, the OMT can be considered as an implementing measure of those programmes.
It is, indeed, hard to see how the negotiation of economic policy goals and the subsequent monitoring within
financial assistance programmes can be considered as monetary policy. Certainly, according to the AG,
purchases of government bonds on secondary markets are monetary policy measures. In order to prevent ‘moral
hazard’ such measures may even be made conditional upon the implementation of certain economic policy
goals. The ECB may, however, not set those economic goals. Otherwise the OMT turns into an implementation
measure for economic policies defined by the ECB which would be beyond its powers. In his opinion the AG
links this argument to the conditionality under the OMT. The argument can, however, be detached from the OMT
and further generalised: The negotiation of policy goals and the subsequent monitoring cannot be considered to
be still covered by the monetary policy mandate of ECB. Accordingly, the ECB should withdraw from the ‘troika’
and be removed from the ESM Treaty. In implicitly drawing the dividing line between monetary and economic
policy the AG is closing ranks with the ECJ’s anything but uncontroversial reading of the material scope of the
ESM Treaty as being linked to economic rather than monetary policy in its Pringle judgment (Case C-370/12).
The prohibition of monetary financing and the ‘embargo period’
Open market operations (Article 18.1 ECB Statute) such as purchases of government bonds on secondary
markets do not, in principle, infringe the prohibition of monetary financing of Member States (Article 123 TFEU)
unless, in the eyes of the AG, they influence the formation of market prices for government bonds on primary
markets. In order to avoid such an influence he suggests an ‘embargo period’ of a given number of days before
the Eurosystem will purchase government bonds. In his view this would permit a market price to form for the
relevant government bonds.
The suggested ‘embargo period’ appears, however, not to be able to prevent a potential circumvention of the
prohibition of monetary financing. Private investors and banks will anticipate and price in the fact that the
Eurosystem will purchase government bonds after an ‘embargo period’. This leads to the assumption made by
the GCC that the quantity of purchases of government bonds rather than the time of purchases influences the
formation of market prices on primary markets. Interestingly, in the opinion of the AG, an ex ante quantitative limit
on purchases of government bonds “would seriously undermine the effects which the intervention on the
secondary market seeks to achieve, with the risk of triggering speculation” (para 182). Whilst this argument
appears convincing with regard to the economic effects of the OMT in general, it becomes debatable if one
refers to the ‘formation of market prices on primary markets’ in order to assess a possible circumvention of the
prohibition of monetary financing through purchases of government bonds on secondary markets.
Outlook
Given the catch-22 situation the AG, unsurprisingly, fails in finding the ‘golden mean’. A final judgment of the ECJ
that would rubberstamp the opinion of the AG would most likely have to two main consequences. First, the GCC
has – if it sticks to the reasoning in its order for reference – little choice but to declare the OMT to be
unconstitutional, whereby the Bundesbank could not take part in a future implementation of the OMT. Second,
the ECB could decide to use ‘Quantitative Easing’ as a substitute. Such an unconventional monetary policy
measure that covers the purchase of government bonds of all Member States and would not be linked to the
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compliance with policy goals set by financial assistance programmes of the ESM. This would save the ECB’s
position in the ‘troika’ without having to give up the instrument of government bond purchases. The AG’s view on
the violation of the prohibition of monetary financing is suited to also approve ‘quantitative easing’. Should the
ECJ join the AG in his critical reasoning on the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes, an
amendment of the ESM Treaty would be called for, as the latter in its current form provides for a direct
involvement of the ECB, namely in the procedure for granting financial stability support and the negotiations of
the economic policy conditionality.
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in the conduct of monetary policy. This view is not only backed by the wording of Article 127(1) TFEU, which
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requires, in brief, a written justification for the concrete measure which must be exceptional and restricted to
specific cases. The boundaries of proportionality are crossed only where purchases would inevitably lead the
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ECB’s action within ‘troika’ is an economic policy measure
Special attention should be given to the argument that the ECB’s role in the financial assistance programmes
amounts to an economic policy measure which surpasses the mandate of the ECB. Since the implementation of
the OMT is linked to the compliance with certain policy goals under financial assistance programmes of the
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be still covered by the monetary policy mandate of ECB. Accordingly, the ECB should withdraw from the ‘troika’
and be removed from the ESM Treaty. In implicitly drawing the dividing line between monetary and economic
policy the AG is closing ranks with the ECJ’s anything but uncontroversial reading of the material scope of the
ESM Treaty as being linked to economic rather than monetary policy in its Pringle judgment (Case C-370/12).
The prohibition of monetary financing and the ‘embargo period’
Open market operations (Article 18.1 ECB Statute) such as purchases of government bonds on secondary
markets do not, in principle, infringe the prohibition of monetary financing of Member States (Article 123 TFEU)
unless, in the eyes of the AG, they influence the formation of market prices for government bonds on primary
markets. In order to avoid such an influence he suggests an ‘embargo period’ of a given number of days before
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relevant government bonds.
The suggested ‘embargo period’ appears, however, not to be able to prevent a potential circumvention of the
prohibition of monetary financing. Private investors and banks will anticipate and price in the fact that the
Eurosystem will purchase government bonds after an ‘embargo period’. This leads to the assumption made by
the GCC that the quantity of purchases of government bonds rather than the time of purchases influences the
formation of market prices on primary markets. Interestingly, in the opinion of the AG, an ex ante quantitative limit
on purchases of government bonds “would seriously undermine the effects which the intervention on the
secondary market seeks to achieve, with the risk of triggering speculation” (para 182). Whilst this argument
appears convincing with regard to the economic effects of the OMT in general, it becomes debatable if one
refers to the ‘formation of market prices on primary markets’ in order to assess a possible circumvention of the
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Outlook
Given the catch-22 situation the AG, unsurprisingly, fails in finding the ‘golden mean’. A final judgment of the ECJ
that would rubberstamp the opinion of the AG would most likely have to two main consequences. First, the GCC
has – if it sticks to the reasoning in its order for reference – little choice but to declare the OMT to be
unconstitutional, whereby the Bundesbank could not take part in a future implementation of the OMT. Second,
the ECB could decide to use ‘Quantitative Easing’ as a substitute. Such an unconventional monetary policy
measure that covers the purchase of government bonds of all Member States and would not be linked to the
compliance with policy goals set by financial assistance programmes of the ESM. This would save the ECB’s
position in the ‘troika’ without having to give up the instrument of government bond purchases. The AG’s view on
the violation of the prohibition of monetary financing is suited to also approve ‘quantitative easing’. Should the
ECJ join the AG in his critical reasoning on the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes, an
amendment of the ESM Treaty would be called for, as the latter in its current form provides for a direct
involvement of the ECB, namely in the procedure for granting financial stability support and the negotiations of
the economic policy conditionality.
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